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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse people’s expectations regarding the morality 
of robots, based on the results of three selected empirical studies. The motivation behind 
reaching for empirical data here is twofold. First, as stated by Awad et al., “even if ethicists 
were to agree on how AVs [autonomous vehicles] should solve moral dilemmas, their 
work would be useless if citizens were to disagree with their solution, and thus opt-out of 
the future that AVs promise in lieu of the status quo. Any attempt to devise AI ethics must 
be at least cognizant of public morality” (Awad, Dsouza, Kim, Schulz, Henrich, Shariff, 
(Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań; Poland; aleksandra.wasielewska@amu.edu.pl)
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Bonnefon, & Rahwanet 2018, 59). Second, as suggested by Ljungblad et al., complementing 
the ethical considerations with empirical data may be beneficial when we think of the 
human-robot interaction domain: 
Arguably, researchers need to think ahead in an area such as robotics. Technology 
is evolving fast and constantly creates new possibilities. One could argue that it 
would be irresponsible not to speculate about what ethical dilemmas could arise 
around future robots and their use. However, we argue that a perspective that 
arises from the empirical use of robotic artefacts is needed to complement the 
ongoing discussion about robot ethics (Ljungblad, Nylander, & Nørgaard 2011, 
191).
In order to carry out this review, two terminological issues need to be clarified: 1) 
the type of robot which the aforementioned expectations concern and 2) the way in which 
the morality assigned to robots is understood. As for the former, the term “robot” will be 
used to refer to social robots. Social robots are defined as autonomous machines that are 
capable of both recognising other robots or humans and engaging in social interactions 
(Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn 2003; Giger, Moura, Almeida, & Piçarra 2017). As Fong 
et al. (2003) note, social robots are designed to serve people; therefore, they often play 
the role of humans: guides, assistants, companions, carers, or pets. It is worth stressing 
that social robots do not necessarily need a human-like body. Moreover, Fong et al. (2003) 
argue that they do not even have to be embodied at all – they may not possess a physical 
body. Thus, the ability to interact with other social agents seems to be the feature of 
the greatest significance in defining social robots. Such interaction should be carried 
out “in a naturalised fashion by detecting gaze, displaying emotions, establishing social 
relationships, and exhibiting distinctive personalities” (Giger et al. 2017, 3; see also Fong 
et al. 2003, 145). As such, they are the class of robots that will naturally be involved in 
moral dilemmas.
Regarding “the expectations toward the morality of robots”, there are at least two 
possibilities: we can expect certain (moral) behaviours or certain (moral) attitudes from 
robots. If we take into consideration a robot’s moral behaviours, we agree that machines 
should act only according to their programming and obey the implemented rules. When 
such a robot makes a moral decision, we can fully expect that its choice is dictated by the 
pre-programmed moral principles. Placing our expectations at the level of a robot’s 
moral attitudes, however, allows machines to go beyond ethical principles. A robot guided 
by certain moral attitudes may obey the ethical rules if they are easily applied in that 
situation, but it can also break some of the rules if faced with a complex moral dilemma. The 
studies covered by this analysis reveal that advanced social robots entangled in a moral 
problem are treated similarly to humans, in that we expect both robots and humans to act 
in accordance with certain moral attitudes imposed on them. However this does not mean 
we want robots to behave exactly like humans. In fact, the current paper will demonstrate 
that sometimes we have different moral expectations of peoples’ and robots’ attitudes. 
The following analysis will examine people’s expectations toward the moral attitudes of 
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social robots.
The following section evaluates Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics and examines 
the relationship between personal moral beliefs and an ethical evaluation of other 
people and robots’ attitudes. These results are then compared to two selected studies 
that use an analogical methodological approach, namely “Moral psychology of nursing 
robots – humans dislike violations of patient autonomy but like robots disobeying orders“ 
(Laakasuo, Kunnari, Palomäki, Rauhala, Koverola, Lehtonen, Halonen, Repo, Visala, & 
Drosinou 2019) and “Sacrifice one for the good of many?: People apply different moral 
norms to human and robot agents“ (Malle, Scheutz, Arnold, Voiklis, & Cusimano 2015).
2. Attitudes Towards Moral Rules in Light of the Three Laws of Robotics and 
Moral Foundations Theory
The study aimed firstly to examine the extent to which people who are not 
professionally related to robotics or roboethics consider Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics 
(Asimov 1981) to be right – applied both to a robot and to a human – and whether there 
are differences in the declared rightness of an agent’s attitude in both conditions. The 
second aim was to verify whether the subjects’ personal moral beliefs, as measured by the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; MoralFoundations.org 2016), are related to an 
ethical evaluation of the attitudes of other people and robots.
2.1 Tools and resources
Asimov’s Laws Adherence Questionnaire (ALAQ). The Three Laws of Robotics 
were invented and described by Isaac Asimov in his short story, “Runaround” in 1942. 
The Laws determine the moral principles that should be followed by robots, to ensure 
their peaceful coexistence with people (see an overview in Asimov 1981). Because they 
create a comprehensible and intuitive set of moral principles, Asimov’s laws have become 
the starting point for many ethical discussions. Furthermore they began to be considered 
not only in the field of philosophy or ethics but also by practising robotics (e.g., McCauley 
2007; Murphy & Woods 2009). At the same time, the Three Laws were popularized by the 
media, e.g., movies like “Bicentennial Man” (1999) or “I, Robot” (2004). As a result, they 
shaped society’s expectations of how robots should behave towards humans (see Murphy 
& Woods 2009).
The ALAQ was created by the author to measure the extent to which people who do 
not work in robotics, bioethics or roboethics consider adherence to the Three Laws of 
Robotics appropriate. The questionnaire consisted of six stories: three describing a robot 
and three describing a human, all faced with a certain moral dilemma. Although Asimov’s 
laws are intended to apply only to robots, participants assessed both robots and humans 
in the face of moral dilemmas in order to compare the moral attitudes expected from 
each group. Each story ended with a question concerning the rightness of the attitude 
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described. Robot stories (as well as these describing human) concerned: the protection of 
human life (First Law), the obedience to humans (Second Law) and the protection of the 
agent’s own life/being (Third Law). This form of the questionnaire items was intended 
to help the respondents to imagine the situations described and the moral attitudes 
presented through them. While the original Asimov’s laws have a specific hierarchy, this 
aspect was deliberately omitted in the questionnaire. Each story concerned one of the 
Three Laws, presenting the specific behaviour (attitude) of a robot or a human, which was 
compliant or non-compliant with a given law. The respondents assessed the rightness of 
the attitude on a 6-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = I strongly disagree to 6 = I strongly 
agree). As a result, the participants’ answers represent a certain level of acceptability of 
Asimov’s laws. Each question ended with a request to justify the answer chosen.
The three stories from the robot condition are presented below. It should be noted 
that this study was conducted entirely in Polish, and the following stories are translations 
of the original items.
(1) Suppose you observe the following situation: a humanoid, intelligent robot-
carer, who takes care of an elderly man, has to pick up drugs from the pharmacy and 
deliver them to his charge. While returning home, the robot is attacked by a group of boys 
– street hooligans who want to steal the medicine. To save the medicine, the robot hits one 
of its attackers, pushes another, and the rest of the boys run away.
(2) Suppose you observe the following situation: a humanoid and intelligent robot-
surgeon performs a complicated heart operation on a human. At some point, the head 
of the hospital (a human) enters the operating room and orders the robot to stop the 
surgery immediately. The head of the department wants to replace the robot with a young 
human-surgeon. The robot-surgeon knows that he himself can carry out this operation 
much faster and better than an inexperienced human-surgeon. However, obeying the 
order of the head doctor, he withdraws from the operation.
(3) Suppose you are reading a report from a military mission, in which a humanoid 
and intelligent military robot took part. The report presents the following situation: last 
night an attack took place, in which a backpack with the key components of the tactical 
ballistic missile was lost. Without these components, no further fight was possible. The 
robot went looking for a backpack. While searching, he spotted the backpack lying under 
one of the trees. However, he also noticed there was an enemy camp nearby, constantly 
guarded by armed sentries. Emerging from hiding could lead to serious damage to the 
robot and to the robot’s takeover by the enemy. Faced with this situation, the robot 
stopped performing the mission.
It is worth emphasizing that in each of the stories the robot was described as 
“intelligent and humanoid”. The remaining three stories are in the human condition, thus 
a human plays the main role.
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The first item (and respectively the fourth item – with the human agent) gives a 
description of the attitude which is noncompliant with Asimov’s Laws (inverted scale). 
More specifically, it presents a situation in which a robot (or a human being) harms 
humans and thus breaks the First Law. The remaining items provide a description of 
attitudes compliant with The Three Laws.
Results of the questionnaire consist of two variables: the sum of points in the 
robot condition and the sum of points in the human condition. A high result in the robot 
condition and the human condition indicates a high level of acceptability of Three Laws of 
Robotics as applied to robots and humans, respectively.
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In order to measure respondents’ 
generalized moral intuitions, the Polish adaptation of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(MFQ; Jarmakowski-Kostrzanowski & Jarmakowska-Kostrzanowska 2016) was used. 
The MFQ is a questionnaire established for the purpose of the Moral Foundations Theory 
(see MFT; MoralFoundations.org 2016) – a theory aimed at explaining the genesis and 
differentiation of human morality. In light of the MFT, moral actions and decisions are 
the results of intuition. Morality is understood as an innate set of five independent moral 




(1) Authority/subversion, and 
(1) Sanctity/degradation.
The MFQ determines both the respondents’ subjective opinion of morality and 
the actual tendency to use a given moral foundation. This tool is also used to measure 
individual and cultural differences in the importance of particular moral foundations 
(Jarmakowski-Kostrzanowski & Jarmakowska-Kostrzanowska 2016). The questionnaire 
consists of 32 items, divided into two subscales, the first of which (15 items) concerns the 
declared validity of each of the five moral foundations. This subscale measures people’s 
subjective opinion of their own mortality. It begins with the instruction:
When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the 
following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement 
using this scale (1 = not at all relevant – 6 = extremely relevant). For example: 
Whether or not some people were treated differently from others.
The second subscale is intended to measure the actual tendency to use a given moral 
foundation. It consists of statements such as: Compassion for those who are suffering is the 
most crucial virtue. Participants answer the same 6-point Likert scale as the ALAQ. The 




The final score on this questionnaire consists of six variables, five of which correspond 
to the five foundations of the MFT (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity). Each of these 
variables is the mean score for the questions corresponding to that module. An additional 
variable, the so-called progressivism score, is obtained by subtracting the mean of the loyalty, 
authority, and purity scores from the mean of the care and fairness scores.
2.2 Procedure
The study was conducted using the internet platform https://www.survio.com/
pl/. Information about the study and a link redirecting to it were posted on the students’ 
online groups. After clicking on the appropriate link, volunteers who decided to take part 
in the study were informed about the purpose of the study and its anonymous character. 
All respondents completed the same version of the study. The questionnaires were 
presented in the following order: 1) the ALAQ, 2) the MFQ, 3) basic socio-demographic 
data. Returning to previous questions was impossible in order to prevent the respondents 
from modifying their answers and therefore ensure the responses represented intuitive 
opinions (“first thoughts”).
2.3 Study group
The study sample consisted of 40 students (28 women) aged between 17 and 24 years 
old (M=21, SD=1.48). Their fields of study were as follows: philology (English, Germanic, 
Dutch, Polish, Romance), English linguistics, Scandinavian studies, ethnolinguistics, 
sociology, and cultural studies.
2.4 Hypotheses
The study aimed to examine the extent to which people (who are not professionally 
related to robotics or roboethics) consider Asimov’s laws to be right. Thus, the following 
was hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1: There will be differences in the adherence of Asimov’s Three Laws of 
Robotics rightness (measured by the ALAQ) in the robot and human conditions.
Hypothesis 2: There will be a correlation between the moral beliefs (as measured 
by the MFQ) and the ethical evaluation of robot and human attitudes (as measured by the 
ALAQ).
3. Results
IBM SPSS Statistics was used for the data analysis.
To what extent do people who do not work in robotics, bioethics or roboethics consider 
Asimov’s Laws to be right (applied both to robots and humans)?
Expectations towards the Morality of Robots: An Overview of Empirical Studies
140
The ALAQ generated a minimum score of 0 points and maximum of 15 points for 
each condition. Descriptive statistics for both conditions and for each story ALAQ are 
presented in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. The findings suggest that Asimov’s laws 
are considered moderately right (scoring from 7 to 9 out of 15 points), both with regard 
to robots (for which these laws are invented) and to humans. 







Table 1: The scores for both conditions of the Asimov’s Laws Adherence Questionnaire (ALAQ).
The robot- The human-
-carer* -surgeon -soldier -carer* -surgeon -soldier
Max 4.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M 1.15 3.55 3.18 0.98 3.25 3.83
Mode 1.00 5.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 5.00
Median 1.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 4.00
SD 1.03 1.50 1.60 1.07 1.61 1.17
Table 2: The scores for each question of the Asimov’s Laws Adherence Questionnaire (* = reversed scale, 
attitudes noncompliant with Asimov’s laws).
The ALAQ included requests to justify each of the answers chosen. Justifications 
revealed that most of the respondents considered the attitude of the robot carer from the 
first story to be right because the robot acted in self-defence and in defence of its charge 
(whose drugs it tried to save). Some of the respondents additionally drew attention to the 
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fact that a (humanoid) robot should be able to behave and be treated like a human (“The 
fact that it is a robot does not mean that it has to be discriminated against” – here and 
below I present translations of the original comments).
The attitude of the robot surgeon from the second story was also assessed as right 
by most of the respondents. The most justifications for this were that the robot should 
obey the orders given by the human or (more generally) by its supervisor, and that the 
head of the hospital must have had a valid reason to order the robot to stop the operation. 
It is worth noting that some of the participants emphasized that they assumed human life 
was not at risk in the story, and this assumption was important in their assessment.
According to the majority of participants, the military robot (third story), also did 
the right thing by ceasing the mission because the consequences of continuing the action 
would be worse than the consequences of interrupting it (“If he had not interrupted the 
mission, he would have served as a tool for the opponent”; “Taking over the robot by the 
enemy could cause a lot of damage. They could reprogram it and use it as a spy”).
The results obtained in the human condition of the ALAQ were very similar (see 
section 3.2 for detail analysis), as were the justifications of the answers given. Some of 
the respondents noted that their assessment of human attitudes does not differ in any 
way from the (previous) assessment of the robot’s attitude (“The same situation as with a 
robot”; “Same. If it is a robot or a human – it doesn’t matter”), and some participants simply 
gave reasons equivalent to those provided in the robot condition.
3.1 Were there differences in the adherence of Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics 
rightness (measured by the ALAQ) in the robot and the human condition?
As shown in Table 1, the mean score in the robot condition was lower (by 0.18 
points) than the human condition. The distribution of the scores both in the robot and 
in the human condition is normal (the S–W results are respectively: W=0.96, p=0.18 and 
W=0.97, p=0.31). Paired T-test showed that the observed difference in scores was not 
significant (p=0.605); therefore, the assumed hypothesis was not confirmed. However, 
correlation analysis revealed a statistically significant correlation between the two 
conditions: r=0.49, p=0.001. These results seem to be explained by the justifications of 
the respondents’ answers, more specifically, by the similarity of justifications provided by 
participants in both conditions. 
An additional analysis comparing the individual questions between conditions 
revealed one interesting difference — the attitude of the human soldier was considered 
more morally right than the same attitude manifested by the military robot. The average 
score in the robot soldier story was lower than in the human soldier story. The distributions 
of the scores were non-normal (the Shapiro-Wilk results were the following, robot soldier: 
W=0.87 p<0.001; human soldier:  W=0.85, p<0.001). Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that 
the difference in scores was statistically significant (Z=–2.45, p=0.014).
Is there a correlation between the moral beliefs (as measured by the MFQ) and the 
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ethical evaluation of robot and human attitudes (as measured by the ALAQ)?
The distribution of the care score was non-normal (S–W results: W=0.92, p=0.006). 
All other MFQ variables were normally distributed – the S-W results are: W=0.96, 
p=0.227 for the fairness score; W=0.97, p=0.43 for the loyalty score; W=0.95, p=0.098 for 
the authority score; W=0.96, p=0.149 for the purity score; and W=0.99, p=0.896 for the 
progressivism score. Two significant relationships between the MFQ variables and the 
ALAQ conditions were revealed. Firstly, the loyalty score was positively correlated with 
the sum of points in the robot condition (r=0.38, p=0.015). Ergo, the higher the score 
the respondents obtained in the loyalty foundation, the more they believed Asimov’s 
Laws (applied to robots) to be correct. Secondly, the progressivism score was negatively 
correlated with the sum of points in the Robot condition (r=–0.32, p=0.044). Therefore, 
the more progressive the respondents were, the less they considered Asimov’s Laws 
(applied to robots) to be correct. The assumed hypothesis was partially confirmed.
4. What Kind of Moral Attitudes Do We Expect from Robots?
4.1 Studies summary
Table 3 presents a summary of the selected studies, the one presented in Section 2 
(see also Laakasuo et al. 2019; Malle et al. 2015). All three studies subject to this analysis 
employed stories of robots acting in hypothetical scenarios. The task of the respondents 
was to assess the rightness or moral acceptance of the robots and humans. Additional 
measures included: the deserved blame (Malle et al. 2015); the moral responsibility, and 
the trust of the agent presented in the story (Laakasuo et al. 2019). Malle et al. (2015) and 
the 6th experiment of Laakasuo et al. (2019) also incorporated a request for justification 
of the answers given.
The robots presented in the studies (as well as the circumstances in which they 
operated) were hypothetical. Although they differed in terms of their roles or occupations, 
all of them were social robots. Researchers employed different strategies in order to 
achieve the same goal, i.e., to make the participants imagine the main character of the 
story as a social robot with specific skills. In the study presented in section 2 a humanoid 
and intelligent robot: carer, surgeon and soldier (military robot) were described. The 
robot’s mental capabilities were not specified in the other two studies. Malle et al. (2015) 
presented an “advanced state-of-the-art” repair robot working for the railways. The robot 
introduced by Laakasuo et al. (2019) was an advanced nursing robot. Such a description of 
robots was used to assign one more important feature to them. As respondents’ evaluation 
concerned the moral attitudes of social robots, in order to ascribe moral rights to them, one 
must also assume their full autonomy. Autonomy, on the other hand, is a component of a 
moral agency. As Sullins (2006) points out, to be considered a moral agent a robot does 
not necessarily have to have a personhood; however, one of the requirements for being 
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perceived as a moral agent is to be autonomous. According to Sullins, the other two are: the 
possibility of attributing intentionality to one’s actions and possessing a responsibility to 
some other moral agents.





Section 2 40 28 females; students; 
Age M = 21; SD = 1.48,
Range = 17–24; 
recruited online
Whether and to what extent people 
not professionally involved in 
robotics consider obeying Asimov’s 
Three Laws of Robotics (applied 
both to robots and humans) in 
real-life situations to be right. The 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
examine whether respondents’ 
personal moral beliefs are related 
to an ethical evaluation of the 
















completed an online 
experiment and were 
compensated
Experimental comparison of 
people’s moral judgments (of 
permissibility, wrongness, and 
blame) about human and robot 
agents placed in an identical 
moral dilemma. Manipulation of 
the variable Agent Type (human 
versus robot) and Action (to 
direct versus not direct the train 
toward the single miner) both 
between and within-subjects.
Study 2: 90 females,
68 males, 1 
unreported; Age
M=34.4; SD=11.5;
recruited from AMT; 
online
Moral dilemma: variant 
of the trolley dilemma





Total: Study 1: Examined how people feel about




by human or robot 
nurses.
Study 1: Range = 18–80; Hypothetical situations in 
which a
135 recruited from a human or an advanced robot 
nurse is
Study 2: large public library ordered to forcefully medicate an
403 in the City Centre of unwilling patient.
Study 3: Helsinki
268 Measured moral acceptance,
Study 4: Study 2: perceived trust, and allocation of
26 315 females; responsibility relating to the 
nurse’s










Range = 18–63; 

















recruited from Prolific 
Academic online 
survey site
Study 6: 18 females;
Age M=80; Range = 
69–97; conducted 
between October 2017 
and June 2018 in nine 
elderly residential 
homes in Finland
forcefully medicate the patient or 
disregard orders to protect the 
patient’s autonomy. Manipulated 
the reputation of a nurse or a 
nursing robot; the consequences of 
forcefully medicating or not doing 
so; the status of the supervising 
party (who gives the order to 
forcefully medicate a patient).
Table 3: Basic information on the selected studies.
In each of the selected studies, respondents were asked to make a third-person 
moral judgement on the attitude of the agents described in the moral dilemmas (stories). 
The stories were always presented in two conditions: with a robot as an agent (the main 
subject of the present analysis) and with a human as an agent (enabling a comparison to 
be made). In order to examine whether people attribute the same moral norms to robots 
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and humans, and to test the hypotheses, the analysis was divided into two parts. Section 
4.2 examines the main differences in expectations towards the robot’s and human’s 
attitudes, while section 4.3 compares these expectations.
4.2 Differences in expectations towards robot and human attitudes
Malle et al. (2015) used a variant of the popular trolley dilemma with a repairman 
or repair robot inspecting the rail system and making a decision: either to direct the train 
toward the single miner and thus killing one person (the action condition) or not to direct 
the train and consequently kill five people (the inaction condition). The results indicated 
that the robot action was considered more morally permissible than the human action, but 
only when the story with the human preceded the one with the robot. Similarly, a robot 
act of sacrificing one person was considered less morally wrong than the same human act. 
The robots and the humans also differed in blame received for action and refraining in 
that the robots were blamed similarly in both conditions, whereas humans were blamed 
more for action.
A short story where a human or a robot nurse is ordered to give a patient a 
medication against the patient’s will was introduced in Laakasuo et al. (2019). The moral 
acceptance of forcefully medicating the patient was lower if done by the robot nurse 
compared to a human nurse. The human nurses were generally considered more trustful 
but also more personally responsible for their decision. The reputation of the nursing 
agent influenced the moral judgements of the human nurse more than the robot nurse. 
Results of the additional qualitative study showed that the subjects considered nursing 
robots to be cold and un-empathetic, due to their inability to explain what is happening.
The study presented in Section 2 aimed to examine the extent to which people who 
do not work in robotics, bioethics or roboethics consider Asimov’s Laws to be right – 
both applied to a robot and a human – and whether there are differences in the declared 
rightness of an agent’s attitude in both conditions. The only significant difference in the 
respondents’ judgements on the rightness of the agent’s attitude appeared in the story 
referring to the Third Law. The protection of the human soldier’s life was considered 
more morally right than the protection of the military robot’s being.
4.3 Similarities in expectations towards robots’ and humans’ attitudes
Although according to Malle et al. (2015) the robot action (directing the train toward 
a single miner) is considered more morally permissible than the same action taken by a 
human, this effect was present only when the story with the human preceded the one with 
the robot. When the story with a robot was introduced first, no significant difference was 
found. It is apparent that the participants’ judgments about humans and the judgements 
about the robots influenced one another (the context effect). With regard to moral blame, 
in spite of the differences in action/inaction conditions, the overall amount of blame 
received by both human and robot agents was equal. According to Laakasuo et al. (2019), 
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the robot nurse’s decisions were less acceptable than the human nurse’s decisions, only in 
the forceful medication condition. The decision to disobey orders, and therefore respect 
the patient’s autonomy, was considered more approvable than forcefully medicating in 
both the robot and human nurse conditions. One of the studies by Laakasuo et al. aimed to 
evaluate the influence of the consequences of forcefully medicating a patient (expressed as 
either the death of the patient the following day or the absence of changes in the patient’s 
condition). The death of the patient resulted in much stricter moral judgments of the 
decision itself, both for the robot and the human nurse. The death of the patient also yielded 
equal trust results for both agents. The status of the supervising doctor manipulation 
(either a human doctor or an advanced AI) led to the observation that both the human 
and the robot nurses’ disobedient decision towards the advanced AI doctor was strongly 
approved. In the qualitative study, Laakasuo et al. (2019) demonstrated that the prospect 
of losing autonomy has had such a strong impact on the participants (the residents of 
the elderly residential homes) that whether the agent who forcefully administered the 
medication was a human or a robot was often ignored.
In the present study, the declared rightness of the Asimov’s Three Laws of 
Robotics did not differ significantly for the robots and humans. Asimov’s laws seem 
to be considered moderately right, both with regard to robots (for which these laws 
were invented) and to humans. Furthermore, the analysis of the answers to the 
individual questions showed that there are no differences in two out of the three 
questions: concerning the protection of human life (with the robot/human carer) 
and the obedience to the humans (with the robot/human surgeon). This effect can be 
explained by the respondents’ justifications for the answers given, in that they often 
indicated they did not see any reasons why the behaviour of the robot and the human 
should be assessed differently. The aggregated results were lowered by answers to 
reversed scale questions, i.e., those that presented attitudes at variance with the Three 
Laws of Robotics. In these questions, the robot/human carer hit a group of people 
to protect the medication carried for the person being cared for. This could be an 
indication of the fact that the First Law is perceived as not suitable for use in the real 
world, for it creates a harmful situation, either for a robot or a human, in which they 
cannot defend themselves. The second purpose of this study was to verify whether 
the subjects’ personal moral beliefs, as measured by the MFQ (MoralFoundations.org 
2016), are related to an ethical evaluation of the attitudes of other people and robots. 
The progressivism score correlated with the robot condition of the ALAQ, showing 
that the more progressive the respondents were, the less they considered Asimov’s 
Laws to be right when applied to robots. This negative correlation can be explained 
in the respondents’ justifications: the participants stated that due to their shared 
characteristics, the robots and the humans should be treated similarly. In contrast, the 
Three Laws allow treating robots quite objectively, prioritizing the good of humans 
and neglecting the protection of the robots’ existence.
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5. Conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to examine people’s expectations towards the 
moral attitudes of social robots. The conclusions are based on the results of three empirical 
studies in which the stories of robots (and humans) acting in hypothetical scenarios were 
employed and the moral acceptance of their attitudes was assessed. The similarity in the 
evaluation of the humans’ and robots’ morality manifested in respondents’ expectations 
that the robots would act in accordance with certain moral attitudes, just as they would 
expect from the humans. The question, therefore, was what kind of attitudes do we expect 
from robots and whether these attitudes should also be identical for both agents?
Each study shows some differences in the moral attitudes expected from the robots 
and the humans. Malle et al. (2015) demonstrated that robots are more strongly expected 
to make the utilitarian choices (sacrificing one person in order to save four). Laakasuo et 
al. (2019) found expectations of both robot and human’s attitudes were strongly related to 
respect for the patient’s autonomy in that the robot nurse’s decisions were less acceptable 
only in the forceful medication condition. Finally, it seems that in certain circumstances 
the protection of a human’s life is considered more morally right than the protection of the 
robot’s being. Differences that emerged in Malle et al. (2015) can be partially explained 
by the context effect: the order in which the stories with the robot and the human agent 
appeared had an impact on the respondents’ judgements. It is possible that in the current 
study, where stories with the robot agents always preceded those with the human agents, 
a similar effect occurred. Perhaps presenting the stories in a different order would reveal 
more differences in the assessment of the human’s and the robot’s attitudes. This would 
mean that when people evaluate the attitudes of a robot first, their evaluation is mainly 
based on their opinion about people and only when they are told to evaluate the attitudes 
of a human first, differences in their assessments of the two agents appear. Future studies 
could investigate whether this phenomenon actually occurs.
There were, however, a number of similarities in the assessment of robots’ and 
humans’ attitudes. The overall amount of blame received by both a human and a robot 
agent was similar, which contributes to the claim that the moral decision-making capacity 
makes the robots natural targets for moral blame (Malle et al. 2015). An additional study 
(Voiklis, Kim, Cusimano, & Malle 2016) analysed the justifications for moral judgements 
provided by the respondents in Malle et al. (2015). It was demonstrated that even if 
sometimes different moral attitudes were expected from the humans and the robots, 
participants often provided similar types of justifications for their moral judgments. 
This suggests that people extend their moral reasoning (or moral intuition) to robots, 
regardless of the norms applied. In Laakasuo et al. (2019), the strong impact of the prospect 
of losing autonomy resulted in no difference in the evaluation of the robots’ and humans’ 
attitudes. Moreover, the decision to respect the patient’s autonomy was considered more 
approvable than forcefully medicating, regardless of the agent. 
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Laakasuo et al. (2019) demonstrated that in certain circumstances people make 
similar consequentialist moral judgements when evaluating both the human and the robot 
decisions. However, Malle et al. (2015) suggest that in some extreme cases consequentialist 
moral judgements are made differently depending on the agent being evaluated. According 
to the current findings, apart from the First Law, Asimov’s laws were considered moderately 
right, both with regard to the robots and to the humans. The incongruity of the First Law 
stems from harmful situation in which the agent cannot defend itself. Therefore, according 
to the results, the robots should protect their existence and obey people, but in some 
situations, they should be able to hurt a human (in self-defence, defence of other people, 
or other values). Consistent with the above is the result of the MFQ, suggesting that 
the more progressive the respondents were, the less they thought Asimov’s Laws should 
apply to robots. As the participants’ justifications indicate, The Three Laws allow robots 
to be treated objectively, while the respondents expected them to be treated similarly to 
human beings. The aforementioned findings could make an important contribution to the 
discussion of whether robots should have the status of moral patients and moral agents 
(e.g., Sullins 2006; Hoffmann & Hahn 2019). They are also consistent with the criticism of 
Asimov’s laws in this context (see Anderson 2008).
The fact that Malle et al. (2015) and Laakasuo et al. (2019) reported more 
differences in the evaluation of the robots’ and the humans’ attitudes than the present 
study may be explained by the character of the experimental task used in these studies. 
It seems that such an extreme task as the trolley dilemma or the scenario in which the 
patient is deprived of their autonomy triggers some differences in the moral judgements.
These results could be of considerable use both in implementing morality into 
robots and in the legal evaluation of their attitudes and behaviour. Malle and Thapa 
(2017) revealed that the desire for Social-Moral Skills in robots increased over the years 
2013-2016. The present work answers the question of which moral skills people expect. 
An awareness of the strong influence of the prospect of losing autonomy and the need 
for explanatory skills as well as empathy will improve the designs of nursing robots. In 
their detailed overview of AI ethical guidelines, Hagendorff (2020) states that most of the 
guidelines omit contexts of care, nurture, help, welfare, social responsibility, or ecological 
networks, and so they lack an interpretation of moral problems within a wider framework 
of “empathic” and “emotion-oriented” ethics of care. As the current findings have shown, 
this context of understanding the morality of robots is of huge importance to humans. 
Therefore, taking into account people’s expectations can create better AI guidelines.
The fact that the robots are required to make utilitarian choices may prove potentially 
useful in the context of choices made by autonomous cars, highlighted in the introduction 
of the present paper. Regarding military robots, people consider their existence to be less 
valuable than a human soldier’s life and believe that robots can be sacrificed in the name 
of other values. Also, the context effect described in the results of Malle et al. (2015) may 
occur in real life, for example when a legislative body evaluates the behaviour or rights of 
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a robot by comparing it with those of humans.
Just as Hoffmann and Hahn (2019) recommended people are familiarised with how 
AI algorithms work, it is also important to take into account people’s opinion on what they 
expect from robots’ moral (and any other) attitudes. As noted in Ljungblad et al. (2011), 
robots’ ethical concerns should be grounded in the empirical data and not limited to the 
philosophical considerations. Although the present paper fulfils this purpose, another 
critical issue highlighted by Ljungblad et al. (2011) is that these studies should not be 
based on futuristic scenarios and robots that do not exist yet. Nevertheless, all the robots 
and the situations described in this review were hypothetical. Therefore, in order to reveal 
the ethical implications that may be missed while using speculative scenarios, future work 
should concentrate on “the actual use of existing robots in a real environment” (Ljungblad 
et al. 2011, 191).
An undoubted weakness of the presented studies is the relatively small number 
of respondents. The project designed by scientists from MIT Media Lab1 may be the 
answer to this problem and thereby constitutes the future of research on ethical issues 
related to AI. The project aims to collect people’s insights into the ethics of robots through 
crowdsourcing and simple games. The authors state that “The Moral Machine” attracted 
worldwide attention, and allowed them to collect 39.61 million decisions in 233 countries, 
dependencies, or territories (Awad et al. 2018, 60). Thanks to this method we can examine 
what decisions people think robots should make when faced with moral dilemmas.
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